That's Kripke's 'Humphrey Objection' to modal counterpart theory according to which what's possible for me is the way things are for my counterparts at other possible worlds: 'I care about what's possible for ME, not the way things are for my counterparts'. And there are responses.
Metaphysics aside however sympathy doesn't get us very far morally. I don't feel any sympathy for sweatshop workers or people who are badly off--and I'm not looking for an insurance policy since, as a tenured professor, with enough money to retire any time I please, there is no chance might be forced to do boring pink-collar work. I do however feel empathy for my counterparts at other possible worlds and, because I want to bring it about that my nearby modal counterparts are better off (or maybe that modal counterparts who are better off are nearer by) I agitate for policies that promote the interests of poor people at the actual world whom I do not like and for whom I feel no sympathy.
And, of course, that is self-interested. Utilitarian here: all that matters from the moral point of view are consequences
In defense of humanism, I've argued that the rationale for altruism is modal safety here: https://philpapers.org/rec/BABWCA-2 I am made better or worse off by the ways things are for my counterparts at nearby possible worlds. It is therefore rational, from a self-interested point of view, that I promote policies that benefit people whose lives I <i>could</i> have lived, though managed to escape. E.g. by pure dumb luck I cleared the bar and managed to avoid pink-collar shit work. But the world at which I'm a supermarket checker, a data entry operator, or a secretary are nearby. I escape by the skin of my teeth. So to improve my own wellbeing I agitate for an end to occupational sex segregation, to move the world in which I'm forced to do pink-collar work further away in logical space.
But that's just self-interest, surely: you're tying to produce an insurance policy in case your future life screws up. I don't see that "logical space" has to do with anything here. I can agitate for good conditions in sweatshops because this is good for actually existing other people. That makes sense, and in a trivial sense promotes my well-being, because it's what I want to do and it's gratifying to succeed at what I want to do. I can agitate for good conditions for care workers because that will be good for hypothetical future me.
But hypothetical present me in another world does not seem anyone I can sensibly concern myself with.
That's Kripke's 'Humphrey Objection' to modal counterpart theory according to which what's possible for me is the way things are for my counterparts at other possible worlds: 'I care about what's possible for ME, not the way things are for my counterparts'. And there are responses.
Metaphysics aside however sympathy doesn't get us very far morally. I don't feel any sympathy for sweatshop workers or people who are badly off--and I'm not looking for an insurance policy since, as a tenured professor, with enough money to retire any time I please, there is no chance might be forced to do boring pink-collar work. I do however feel empathy for my counterparts at other possible worlds and, because I want to bring it about that my nearby modal counterparts are better off (or maybe that modal counterparts who are better off are nearer by) I agitate for policies that promote the interests of poor people at the actual world whom I do not like and for whom I feel no sympathy.
And, of course, that is self-interested. Utilitarian here: all that matters from the moral point of view are consequences
In defense of humanism, I've argued that the rationale for altruism is modal safety here: https://philpapers.org/rec/BABWCA-2 I am made better or worse off by the ways things are for my counterparts at nearby possible worlds. It is therefore rational, from a self-interested point of view, that I promote policies that benefit people whose lives I <i>could</i> have lived, though managed to escape. E.g. by pure dumb luck I cleared the bar and managed to avoid pink-collar shit work. But the world at which I'm a supermarket checker, a data entry operator, or a secretary are nearby. I escape by the skin of my teeth. So to improve my own wellbeing I agitate for an end to occupational sex segregation, to move the world in which I'm forced to do pink-collar work further away in logical space.
But that's just self-interest, surely: you're tying to produce an insurance policy in case your future life screws up. I don't see that "logical space" has to do with anything here. I can agitate for good conditions in sweatshops because this is good for actually existing other people. That makes sense, and in a trivial sense promotes my well-being, because it's what I want to do and it's gratifying to succeed at what I want to do. I can agitate for good conditions for care workers because that will be good for hypothetical future me.
But hypothetical present me in another world does not seem anyone I can sensibly concern myself with.